The Southern Baptist Convention’s executive committee voted Tuesday to oust four of its churches, two over policies deemed to be too inclusive of LGBTQ people and two more for employing pastors convicted of sex offenses.

The actions were announced at a meeting marked by warnings from two top leaders that the SBC, the largest Protestant denomination in the United States, was damaging itself with divisions over several critical issues including race.

“We should mourn when closet racists and neo-Confederates feel more at home in our churches than do many of our people of color,” said the SBC’s president, J.D. Greear, in his opening speech.

The two churches expelled for LGBTQ inclusion were St. Matthews Baptist Church in Louisville, Kentucky, and Towne View Baptist Church, in Kennesaw, Georgia.

Towne View’s pastor, the Rev. Jim Conrad, told The Associated Press last week that he would not appeal the ouster and plans to affiliate his church, at least temporarily, with The Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, which lets churches set their own LGBTQ policies.

Towne View began admitting LGBTQ worshippers as members in October 2019 after a same-sex couple with three adopted children asked Conrad if they could attend, a decision he defends as the right thing to do.

“The alternative would have been to say, ‘We’re probably not ready for this,’ but I couldn’t do that,” said Conrad, pastor there since 1994.

St. Matthews Baptist was among more than 12 churches that lost their affiliation with the Kentucky Baptist Convention in 2018 because they made financial contributions to the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship, which had recently lifted a ban on hiring LGBTQ employees.

SBC officials said Westside Baptist Church in Sharpsville, Pennsylvania, was ousted because it “knowingly employs as pastor a registered sex offender,” while Antioch Baptist Church in Sevierville, Tennessee, has a pastor who was convicted of statutory rape.

The two-day executive committee meeting opened Monday, with a schedule featuring speeches by Greear and executive committee president Ronnie Floyd bemoaning the multiple acrimonious divisions within the denomination.

“This sound of war in the camp of Southern Baptists is concerning to me, and I know it is also concerning to many of you,” Floyd said. “While we hear and see how the American culture is so out of control, my friends, our own culture within the Southern Baptist family is also out of control.”

Floyd noted that the divisions mirror ideological, political and racial differences nationwide.

“In this fever-pitch environment, each of us needs to be very careful with the words we write, speak, tweet or post,” he said. “As SBC leaders and followers of Jesus, our public behavior matters.”

Greear addressed racial tensions in the SBC, a longstanding problem that has recently been rekindled. Some Black pastors have left the SBC and others are voicing dismay over pronouncements by the SBC’s six seminary presidents — all of them white — restricting how the subject of systemic racism can be taught at their schools.

Going forward, Greear said, Black Southern Baptists should be included in discussions on this topic, including the SBC’s stance toward the concept of Critical Race Theory, which the seminary presidents repudiated.

“The reality is that if we in the SBC had shown as much sorrow for the painful legacy that racism and discrimination has left in our country as we have passion to decry CRT, we probably wouldn’t be in this mess,” Greear said

“Do we want to be a Gospel people, or a Southern culture people? Which is the more important part of our name — Southern or Baptist?”

After the two speeches, the executive committee unanimously adopted an expansion plan called Vision 2025. It would increase full-time Southern Baptist international missionaries from 3,700 to 4,200, boost the number of congregations by 5,000 and seek to reverse the decline in baptizing 12- to 17-year-olds.

Floyd said SBC churches are baptizing 38% fewer teenagers than in 2000.

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Associated Press religion coverage receives support from the Lilly Endowment through The Conversation U.S. The AP is solely responsible for this content.

ATLANTA (AP) — Georgia lawmakers want to give district attorneys access to prisoner disciplinary records to help the prosecutors oppose parole requests.

The House voted 99-66 on Thursday to pass House Bill 168, sending it to the Senate for more debate.

Rep. Jesse Petrea, a Savannah Republican, said the measure is needed because some people are being released who have disciplinary records indicating that they are a risk.

He cited the case of Torrey Scott. Within three months of being paroled, Scott raped two Savannah State University students, raped and killed a Port Wentworth woman, and raped another woman he kidnapped from a Savannah hospital parking lot between December 2013 and February 2014. Scott is now serving life without parole in prison.

”This bill is about how we protect our people and our community from someone like Torrey Scott,” Petrea told House lawmakers.

He said that knowing how someone behaved in prison recently would be a good guide to whether they’re ready to be released, saying many inmates are disciplined for wrongdoing that would bring criminal charges outside prison.

“If individuals are operating that way in prison, it’s a pretty good indicator that they may be a risk to the broader society,” Petrea said.

Prosecutors would only get access to records for people convicted of violent felonies or some serious sexual offenses. The bill would make it a misdemeanor for the district attorney to release the information to the public.

House Minority Leader James Beverly, a Macon Democrat, questioned whether a defense attorney would have access to the records. Petrea said an inmate could share records they are given with a defense lawyer.

But Rep. Josh McLaurin, a Sandy Springs Democrat, said hearings on the bill had raised questions that were never answered.

He said sometimes bad information is conveyed to the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. He said testimony also showed the state Department of Corrections has given the parole board access to every file for every person in state custody, despite a lack of statutory authority for doing so.

“If all files are declassified, it means none of them are state secrets anymore, which means we wouldn’t need this bill,” McLaurin told House members, saying the Department of Corrections is not following “any systemic policy” on the issue and needs more legislative oversight.

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Follow Jeff Amy on Twitter at http://twitter.com/jeffamy.

NARSOL’s Litigation Summit was a huge success and well received by over 220 viewers.

Thanks to the work of some extraordinary volunteers as well as the participation of our guests, NARSOL Live | Litigation Summit, NARSOL’s second major webcasting event, came off without a hitch. This was the first time NARSOL relied upon its in-house technology team to facilitate a virtual event from start to close. Much appreciation and gratitude are owed to Andy, Brendan, Craig, Fred, Michael, and Tammy for their assistance with technology and promotion.

NARSOL expresses gratitude for the outstanding presentations by a slate of attorneys throughout the nation: Mark Yurachek of Georgia, Erica Dubno of New York, Paul Reingold of Michigan, Adele Nicholas of Illinois, Aaron Marcus of Pennsylvania, as well as NARSOL’s general counsel and chief civil rights attorney, Paul Dubbeling of North Carolina.

The volunteer members of the Conference Operations Committee in cooperation with NARSOL’s Conference Planning Committee helped to plan and execute the live event which was emceed by our capable and gregarious host, Don Thurber, NARSOL’s state contact for South Carolina, along with appearances by NARSOL’s executive director, Brenda Jones,  the president of NARSOL’s foundation, Robin Vander Wall, and NARSOL board member Philip Kaso.

Thank you all! And thank everyone who signed-up to participate in NARSOL’s first litigation summit! Remember that you will have access to the program for 30 days in case you missed a session or want to see some again. You will be receiving information soon about accessing it. Judging from the initial responses of appreciation and adulation, it is very likely the first of many such webcasting events to come.

By Larry . . . On September 24, 2019, NARSOL engaged an attorney and filed a lawsuit a suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia challenging the Butts County Sheriff’s Office’s practice of placing warning signs at the residences of registered persons before Halloween. The court granted a request for a preliminary injunction which prevented the Butts County Sheriff’s Office from erecting signs on the property of the plaintiffs during the 2019 Halloween holiday. With Halloween 2020 rapidly approaching, NARSOL’s legal team moved for Summary Judgment (decision without a trial) to permanently enjoin the sheriff’s office from placing signs in front of their homes, or, in the alternative, a new preliminary injunction barring sign placement during 2020 Halloween. Unfortunately, the court denied our motion for summary judgment and resolved the case against us, denying the relief we had sought. In addition, most of the assertions raised in the complaint were dismissed with prejudice meaning they cannot be raised again.

Background

One of the registrants lives with his 6-year-old daughter and his parents, who own the home where they all reside. Shortly before Halloween 2018, two Butts County sheriff’s deputies appeared at his door to inform him that the sheriff’s office would be placing a sign in front of  their home. The sign conveyed a “community safety message” from the sheriff’s office “warning” that there could be no trick-or-treating at the home. The other plaintiffs had similar stories.

As amended, their complaint asserted three claims:

• That the state compelled speech from the plaintiffs in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
• That the state trespassed in violation of state law.
• That the state committed an unlawful taking of the plaintiffs’ property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Explanation of Summary Judgment

“Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. All facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The Court’s function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper question for the factfinder. The Court does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter. Nor does the Court search the record ‘to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.’ Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479- 80 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, ‘the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’ ” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

The standards upon which a court evaluates motions for summary judgment do not change when, as here, both parties seek to resolve the case through the vehicle of cross-motions for summary judgment. “The fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not mean that the court must grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other; summary judgment in favor of either party is not proper if disputes remain as to material facts.” Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Instead, “. . . the court must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Id. For more details, see our article on Does v. Rausch in the August/September Digest.

What is Trespass?

The plaintiffs brought two claims alleging the signs intrude on their property rights.  It is undisputed that two of the plaintiffs did not own the property where each resided at the times the signs were placed. The defendants argue that as a result, neither of them had “standing to assert any claim that turns on a real property interest.” The defendants contended that a third party who is not a property owner cannot maintain a trespass action, and the Court agreed.   , 214 Ga. 149, 151, 103 S.E.2d 557 (1958) (“To maintain an action for trespass or injury to realty, it is essential that the plaintiff show either that he was the true owner or was in possession at the time of the trespass.”) The plaintiffs accused the defendants of “an inaccurate recitation of the law as addressed” and cited contrary ‘authority.’ That authority consisted of three cases.  The court stated, “None remotely supported their argument.” Order at 9.

Quoting from the Order the court stated, “Under Georgia law, “[t]respass is a wrongful interference with the right to the exclusive use and benefit of a property right.” Bishop Eddie Long Ministries, Inc. v. Dillard, 272 Ga. App. 894, 901, 613 S.E.2d 673, 682 (2005) (citing OCGA § 51-9-1). The plaintiffs argue, perplexingly, that “[t]he facts underlying Petitioners’ trespass claims are wholly undisputed by either party[.]” Doc. 50-1 at 29. Among those purportedly undisputed facts, they say, is that “Respondents were entering private property which was closed to the public[.]” Id. at 30.  But that critical issue is, in fact, hotly disputed: The defendants claim they placed the signs in the rights-of-way.  Doc. 51-1 ¶ 4. But as critical as that issue is, the parties have all been unable to find evidence establishing the location and extent of the rights-of-way, if any, on the plaintiffs’ properties.  Nor have they been able to find legal authority that resolves the relative rights of the general public, the abutting landowner, and the sheriff’s office in the rights-of-way. Order at 11-12.

The court stated, “There is no clearly established law that every temporary physical invasion of property constitutes a taking. Further, if even the parties’ counsel have not yet found law establishing the location of the rights-of-way and the relative rights of the parties in the rights-of-way, certainly a reasonable officer would not have known the placement of the signs interfered with the plaintiffs’ property interests. And again, the officers have adduced undisputed evidence that they at least attempted to place the signs in what they believed was the right-of-way. They are entitled to qualified immunity on the takings claim.” Order at 18-19.

Compelled Speech0

The First Amendment “forbids abridgement of the freedom of speech,” and “freedom of speech includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”  Now, the record is more developed, and there is evidence that the sheriff’s office does not now have a policy of prohibiting or the intention to prohibit competing speech. The plaintiffs dispute this, citing the sheriff’s testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing before last Halloween. They cite no further evidence showing such a policy or intention. On the issue of injunctive relief, the initial question, then, is whether the record provides evidence that the sheriff’s office intends to bar the plaintiffs from placing competing messages. It does not. Whatever the sheriff’s office planned to do in 2019, it is clear now it will not attempt to impinge the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs are free to offer speech competing with the Sheriff’s Office’s views and to disassociate themselves from those views. Order at 21-22.0

Is There Hope?

Yes, because the court was not able to resolve all issues, particularly the issue of whether the signs were on public right-of-way or private property. Quoting from the order, “The Court first makes clear what it is not concluding. The Sheriff’s Office believes it has the right to post the signs in front of the Plaintiffs’ homes as long as the signs are in yet to be defined rights-of-way and that it can prosecute anyone who moves the signs.  The Court doesn’t reach that issue, but as noted, the Defendants have scant authority to support either proposition.  And the Court certainly doesn’t conclude, given the facts here, that putting the signs in the Plaintiffs’ yards makes sense. Rather, the Court only concludes that, for the most part, the relief the Plaintiffs seek is not available.” Order at 28.